A STRUCTURE FOR HISTORY: REFLECTIONS FROM KUHN’S HISTORIOGRAPHIC STUDIES

Rezumat

In the present work, we aim to analyze Lorraine Daston’s critiques of the historiographical value of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: we will defend its relevance from the attacks of “the history of contingencies”. Daston’s proposal asserts that the Kuhnian historiographical programme of professionalizing the history of science (moving it towards history departments to the detriment of science departments) has been fulfilled but has resulted in the abandonment of the Hegelian spirit from Kuhn’s historiography, i.e. the search for “a structure” of the history of science has been abandoned. We will analyze and incorporate
the recent responses from K. Brad Wray and Pablo Melogno. Finally, through a thorough analysis of the relationships between philosophy and the history of science, particularly in Kuhn’s work, we will propose a defense of the systematic and explicit use of metatheoretical structures for historiographical endeavors.