The journal publishes articles in analytic philosophy broadly construed. Topics range from logic, philosophy of mathematics and epistemology to metaphysics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of language, but is not limited to these areas. Submissions are subject to peer blind review. For issues in the past two years, more than 28% of submissions were published after at most two rounds of review. The journal primarily targets early career researchers in philosophy or doctoral students, but carefully analyzes each submission and is open to all collaborative projects, especially those coming from researchers in social sciences or humanities.
Editura Universității din București - Bucharest University Press
As characterized here, primary examples are universal judgements which make the connection between theory and natural language, and contribute to the instantiation of a theory or a whole research domain. They are segments of reasoning that are constructed from perceptual states had as part of wide-ranging experiences accessible to those thinkers who encounter primary examples. There are at least three traits that Primary Examples must have in order to be considered as such. Primary examples must be pertinent to a theory, to the point of being fully inserted and implemented in the theory. Primary examples must exhibit generality, where generality is seen as the template for a general dynamic hidden in space-time and revealed by primary examples. Primary examples must be convincing, to the point that by nature of their perceptual states, their reasoning should prove undeniable, as opposed to abstract principles and notions. In order to prove the merit of primary examples, I will refer to the literature on objectivity in science and show how primary examples are employed in scientific experiments.
Copyright (c) 2025 Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy
MIRCEA FLORIAN ȘI STRUCTURA RECESIVITĂȚII. RECESIVITATEA CA STRUCTURĂ A LIMBAJULUI
Unele cărți conțin, undeva din adâncul lor, fraze cu implicații existențiale care nu doar uimesc orice gândire, ci o obligă să înțeleagă sensul lor. Mircea Florian, în ”Recesivitatea ca structură a lumii” (1983; de aici înainte voi folosi prescurtarea RSL) scrie: ”Recesivitatea este factorul tulburător, neliniștea lumii, asimetria cosmosului. În această structură complexă, anume recesivitatea, rezidă tragicul lumii.” RSL este o carte despre noțiunile prime ale gândirii noastre, despre conceptele-perechi prezente în arhitectura noastră cognitivă. Aceste noțiuni sau categorii sunt noțiuni aflate într-un raport de opoziție, de contrarietate și, mai precis, de recesivitate: noțiuni pozitive opuse, dintre care una are caracter dominant, iar cealaltă, cea care vine după, deci recesivă, are o semnificație superioară. Fiind un studiu despre noțiuni, RSL ar putea fi interpretată ca fiind o carte despre limbaj. Limbajul însă, în viziunea lui Mircea Florian, reflectă structura gândirii, iar gândirea reflectă structura lumii. Ontologia are prioritate în fața mentalului și a semanticii. Am putea spune că este un tratat metafizic clasic despre categorii. Mircea Florian nu vorbește însă de categorii deoarece consideră că acest termen este „contaminat de subiectivism, pe linie kantiană” (RSL, Vol. I, 83). Dar atunci despre ce fel de proiect metafizic este vorba în RSL? Ce tip de discurs filosofic ne este propus și care, în principiu, ne permite să înțelegem tragicul și neliniștea lumii? Scopul principal al analizei mele va fi, în primul rând, să răspund la această întrebare. În al doilea rând, voi încerca să răspund la o altă întrebare, anume dacă nu cumva recesivitatea este o structură nu a lumii (deci ontologică), ci mai degrabă a unor limbaje (și, ca atare, conceptuală).
ESSENTIALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: AN INEVITABLE (RE)INTRODUCTION
Recent conversations in environmental studies tilt towards the imperative for local knowledge systems. This knowledge is often held by non-experts and outside formal institutional settings. Lived experiences offer alternative perspectives on environmental crises. The challenge, however, remains: how might alternate knowledge be integrated into broader environmental action conversations? In response, metaphysical coherentism, according to which reality consists of a network of independent elements, where every component is grounded in relation to others, is proposed. Such grounding could accommodate the plurality of perspectives that are inherent in the environmental crisis and address the top-down approach in policy frameworks. Metaphysical coherentism argues that greater clarity is needed in the ontological categories of environmental studies.
THE DOUBLE EMPATHY PROBLEM AS A DIALOGIC SENSE-MAKING STYLE ASYMMETRY
The occurrence of social comprehension difficulties when people living with autism, henceforth: autistics,2 interact with neurotypicals motivates the re-emergence of key questions about the mind and its interaction with other minds; what are minds and how do they relate to the world and others? The disruption of smooth social interaction brings forth the question of how is a mind able to socially interact and this question motivates one to tacitly provide a definition of what a mind is. This is visible in Simon-Baron Cohen’s exposition of the theory of mind theory, henceforth: ToM, in his book Mindblindness. In this book, Baron Cohen states that autistics have at least a degree of mindblindess and that mindreading3 is the means through which the mind relates to other minds.4 His tacit descriptions of ontological properties of the mind, henceforth: ontological descriptions or assertions, are utterly different from those provided by enactivists and by those who contribute to the 20th century tradition of phenomenology, henceforth: phenomenologists.5 The tension between the ontological descriptions of ToM Theory and those provided by enactivists and phenomenologists has led to a thriving battle ground. This article’s key aim is to provide descriptions that facilitate enactivist or phenomenological analyses that engage with the double empathy problem hypothesis. To bring its aim to fruition, I follow three steps. Firstly, I define the approaches and concepts I use: phenomenology, enactivism, and the double empathy problem. Secondly, I argue in favor of using phenomenology and enactivism for explaining social difficulties in autism by presenting two, at least prima facie, disadvantages of Baron Cohen’s articulation of ToM theory; one disadvantage stems from the ethical implications of his ontological assertions and the other stems from his ontological assertions. Thirdly, I describe autistic-neurotypical social interactions in a non-pathologizing manner by performing an enactivist analysis of the double-empathy problem surrounding autistic-neurotypical social interactions.
THINNING THE JUNGLE OF “UNCONCEIVED ALTERNATIVES.” STANFORD’S ANTIREALISM MEETS EXPECTED UNIFICATIONS AND AVOIDABLE INCONSISTENCIES
K. Stanford (2006, 2009) has offered an antirealist argument (the “problem of unconceived alternatives”, PUA) based on the argument that scientists are not able to grasp alternatives to a current scientific theory T. According to PUA, the mere existence of some epistemically inaccessible alternatives (T’, T”, …) weakens our trust in T and shakes the foundations of mainstream scientific realism. The realist may entertain the inkling that inter-theoretical relations (both existing and expected or ‘hoped-for’) play a role in accepting or rejecting PUA. The most celebrated intertheoretical relations, such as consilience, reduction, realization, emergence, equivalence, or approximation—whether prospective, expected, or realized—bear relevance to the conceivability of their alternatives. This paper presents an ‘eliminative inference’ based on an ‘unification posit’ that weakens the PUA. We employ first a minimal model of inter-theoretical unification couched in terms of the ‘term identification’ of the theoretical terms of two initially different theories, T1 and T2. Then we rethink unification as an ‘ideological identification’ where predicates in different theories are identified. Finally, we can envision a more sophisticated unification as entailment relations among T1 and T2 and their empirical grounds. In all these cases, we propose scenarios of inconceivability based on a minimal consistency requirement run against the “syntactic view” of scientific theories. The upshot of this mechanism is that some alternatives to T1, which remain unconceived within the conceptual and ideological space of T1, can be eliminated because they are inconsistent with empirical constraints on T2. The overall space of ‘serious’ alternatives to both theories is ‘thinned.’ Consistency is a requirement that conditions inter-theoretical relations, mainly when the overlapping evidence supports theories. This argument illustrates in what sense PUA is lessened when scientists or scientific communities operate based on theoretical posits.
THE DERIVABILITY GAP – A PROBLEM OF INTUITIONS
This paper addresses our difficulty in grasping how something like consciousness could emerge from the processes of our brain, aiming to explain the intuitions that underlie this struggle. I start with an investigation of materialism, revealing that its supporters often have deep-seated dualist intuitions implicitin some of the language they use. I then question whether we can warrant the claim that conscious experience is fundamentally different from non-conscious phenomena with respect to causal powers and causal roles. I identify the derivability gap as the reason behind our intuitive struggles, explaining how these intuitions make it difficult to accept a materialist view of consciousness. Lastly, I explain why we hold onto these intuitions. Instead of seeking a socio-cultural origin for our dualist intuitions about the mind-body problem, I suggest we examine our intuitive grasp of the physical world, arguing that our tendency to see things in binary on/off forms extends beyond our grasp of consciousness. I propose that we consider whether the same simplifying principle that aids our understanding of unobservables might also influence how we conceive consciousness. I conclude that our lack of direct exposure to its complexity may underlie our binary understanding of life and non-life, which we extend to the contrast between material and non-material.
EXPLAINING ACTIONS: THE MODEL OF TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION AND ITS DIFFICULTIES
The classical model for explaining an action (i.e. for answering the question why someone has done something) usually puts an agent’s desires at the center of the explanation: it is because the agent desired something that the action took place. Collins argues that an appeal to purposes could be a more appropriate explanation, that is, he offers a teleological account of action. In his view, actions could be described as a “compensation” for a perceived lack, for an unaccomplished purpose of the agent, in the way a thermostat or a helmsman brings corrections to a perceived state of affairs. The purpose of my essay is to discuss the difficulties encountered by his proposal. I argue that one needs a clearer account for what may count as “compensatory” in order for the theory to be able to distinguish between a random event, a causal effect and a compensatory action.
Scientists have attempted to find consciousness and, more specifically, qualia in the physical world ever since philosophers such as Thomas Nagel (1974) or Frank Jackson (1986) have commented upon the elusive experiential properties of such mental states that are characterized by a specific “what’s it like”. One of the proposals to minimize the metaphysical and epistemological tension that arises once the existence of such phenomena is acknowledged originates in the influential paper “What is it like to be a bat?” (Nagel, 1974): the development of an objective phenomenology. Current research programmes follow this idea and aim to understand consciousness using mathematical-empirical models. However, these endeavors seem to be missing the point when studying consciousness because they do not provide any evidence about how qualia correspond to neural states. I argue against a proposal to account for the missing link between physical structures and qualia, namely the use of category theory (Tsuchiya et al., 2016). Instead, I conjecture that the endeavor is futile because it relies on the assumption that qualia can be described structurally from an epistemological point of view. I support my conjecture arguing that phenomenal holism has not been ruled out.
VIZIUNEA PLATONICIANĂ MODIFICATĂ ȘI O NOUĂ PERSPECTIVĂ
This paper examines a modified Platonic view, characterized by gauge symmetry and non-Euclidean geometry, as a framework for understanding the laws governing our known Universe. Building upon the work of physicist Lee Smolin, this perspective has also undergone a critical analysis that has provided the basis for a conceptual clarification of the modified Platonic view. As a result, the article proposes a more nuanced approach, termed the approximate, modified Platonic view, which aims to highlight the limitations but also the attractions of Platonism.
(RE)THEORIZING THE MEASUREMENT OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES
This text critically examines whether psychometric scales represent a robust measurement choice when studying conspiracy theories: a key philosophical and methodological gap in the literature on conspiracy theories. I call into question whether such scales have content validity, predictive validity and whether studies employing these instruments manifest external validity, respectively. These issues manifest differently across the two types of scales examined. The adequate development of applied scales is unfeasible because it is impossible to objectively define an ideal combination of items that fully captures the conspiratorial themes they aim to measure. Applied scales will, then, always have limited content validity, which will not only impair our ability to understand whether they really measure the construct in question but will also prevent us from using them in a standardized way. While generic scales may seem superior to applied scales in that they allow for standardized measures, they seem to suffer from the same problem due to the theoretically limitless number of dimensions needed to fully capture conspiratorial ideation. Consequently, the degree to which the predictions made on the basis of these scales are valid (i.e. predictive validity) and their generalizability (i.e. external validity) becomes unclear. In this text, I argue that the employment of psychometric scales does not represent a robust method of measuring conspiracy theories. This situation raises concerns regarding the current state of the literature, since these instruments are widely used in this research area. Given the discussed shortcomings, I propose a novel approach to measurement, one that involves indirect assessment of conspiracy theories. Moreover, a better alternative to existing measures is considered, namely discourse analysis.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEVELOPING AN OBJECTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY
Thomas Nagel’s end note of his famous essay “What is it like to be a bat?” introduced the speculative proposal of developing an objective phenomenology capable of enabling further empirical studies of consciousness. I will argue that such an endeavor inevitably faces two major difficulties in the first-order inaccessible qualia and second-order inaccessible qualia. The latter essentially comprise all of our qualitative contents associated with our experiences, as all qualia are private or inaccessible by other agents who do not share the same point of view, while the former should be seen as a subgroup of phenomenal contents that are temporarily or permanently unconscious or, more explicitly, unavailable to the agent to whom they belong to.
FREGE ON INFORMATIVE IDENTITIES BETWEEN STATEMENTS
The Frege-Husserl correspondence can be fruitfully explored so as to provide new insight into the paradox of analysis. Why are some identifies informative and others not? And how could we ascertain the issue if under scrutiny are mathematical identities, necessarily true if true at all? This text articulates the distinction between logical and semantic criteria in order to clarify a possible Fregean solution to the paradox of analysis, starting from regarding analysis as generating particular cases of Frege puzzles.
DOES THE MEANING OF LYING POSE A PROBLEM TO PINOCCHIO’S PARADOX?
In this paper I sketch two solutions to Pinocchio’s Paradox, mainly by resorting to the concept of lying, as it is conceived by Augustine in his “De mendacio”. I will argue that the paradox is based on a slightly narrow conception of what it means to lie, as it confuses the meaning of lying with the meaning of falsity from the correspondence theory of truth. Furthermore, I will claim that the problems that I have highlighted are sufficient conditions to block the entire paradox and, therefore, to show that the argument that supposedly leads to a contradiction is actually fallacious.
Copyright (c) 2024 Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy
A constant of Frege’s writing is his rejection of indeterminate predicates as found in natural language. This paper follows Frege’s remarks on vagueness from the early "Begriffsschrift” to his mature works, drawing brief parallels with the main contemporary theories of vagueness. I critically examine Frege’s arguments for the inconsistency of natural language and argue that the inability to accommodate vagueness in his mature ontology is mainly due to heuristic rules of thumb which Frege took as essential, not to a deep problem in his fundamental apparatus.
COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE YOGA-SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY – INTERSECTIONS WITH CURRENT DEBATES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
This paper explores the intersection of Yoga-Samkhya philosophy with contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. While mainstream philosophy of mind has primarily embraced physicalism, asserting that everything has an underlying physical basis, it still fails to account satisfactorily for why or how exactly consciousness, and in particular its phenomenal aspect, would arise from neural structures and mechanisms. The paper argues for the relevance of ancient Eastern philosophies, specifically Samkhya-Yoga, in addressing persisting dilemmas regarding the relationship between the body, mind, and consciousness. The Samkhya philosophy, rooted in metaphysical dualism between material (prakrti) and spirit (purusa), introduces a perspective different from Western Cartesian dualism. The mind, in Samkhya, is considered part of nature or matter, distinct from consciousness or spirit. The article explores how Samkhya's ideas on the mind-body relationship, the role of intellect (buddhi), and the concepts of gunas (qualities of matter) and koshas (sheaths or aspects of human being) could enrich modern discussions. Samkhya proposes a form of panpsychism, suggesting that consciousness is inherent in everything, while differentiating between an immaterial, immutable and unchanging witnessing consciousness (purusa), free from the constraints of physicality, time and space, and unaffected by the continuous fluctuations of the material mind. The article concludes by asserting that considering Samkhya-Yoga's perspectives could reframe current debates, providing a constructive alternative to both Cartesian dualism and prevalent physicalism in understanding consciousness. The ancient philosophical insights from Samkhya-Yoga might offer valuable contributions to the ongoing discourse in the philosophy of mind.
COMTE ȘI POZITIVISMUL de WILLIAM WHEWELL
Despre „filosofia pozitivă” s-a vorbit și discutat des în ultimii ani, iar maniera în care este tratată și publicațiile în care se poartă discuțiile implică faptul că ea ar fi un subiect de mare interes. Astfel că am încrederea că ea ar putea reprezenta, domnule Editor, un subiect potrivit pentru paginile Revistei dumneavoastră, iar eu sunt gata să-mi aduc contribuția la această discuție.
GALILEO’S LAW: ON SOME ARGUMENTS CONCERNING FALLING BODIES
A law saying that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones has been held to be refutable independently of empirical experiments, with a priori “thought experiments”. I argue that these thought experiments do not qualify as good arguments against the law.
POLITICAL OBLIGATION WITHOUT COMPREHENSIVENESS
Philosophical anarchists deny state legitimacy because they reject traditional accounts of political obligation and any possible alternatives. Their arguments have been powerful enough to create a vacuum where a presumption of a far-reaching moral requirement to obey the state once resided. Many “statists” have attempted to rework traditional bases for political obligation, uncover neglected ones, or create new ones altogether. Of these, defenders of a “weak” legitimacy might agree with philosophical anarchists that there is no political obligation, but deny that legitimacy without political obligation is conceptually or morally problematic. Thus, they may agree with statists that there are, in fact, legitimate states while agreeing with philosophical anarchist that legitimate states do not have a right to our obedience. But there is still a puzzle before us left by centuries of work associating the legitimacy of the state with its right to our obedience. Surely there is something important enough about the state’s right to impose and enforce law that entails some obligation in us to obey it, right? One possible solution to this puzzle is to hold “strong” legitimacy, such that political obligation is a necessary condition for it, together with “weak” political obligation, such that our requirements to obey are limited or attenuated in a principled fashion. I attempt to sketch such a possibility below. I do this by rejecting a basic assumption held by anarchists and statists in discussions of political obligation and legitimacy.
This presents the Epimenides and some related paradoxes with a brief history. It is then argued that the paradoxes arise from mistaken assumptions about what the relevant problem sentences say. For example, one paradox has the sentence A: “The sentence A is not true” and two premises: (i) that a sentence is true iff what it says is true and (ii) what the sentence A says is that the sentence A is not true. Premise (ii) is false. A similar mistake about what is said is involved in the Epimenides. Paradoxes involving other “propositional attitudes” such as belief, require different treatment, but the proper interpretation of the words involved is, again, the primary requirement for relief.
FILOSOFIE ȘI PARADOX: SENSUL UNEI CĂRȚI PLINE DE NONSENSURI
Wittgenstein's Tractatus provides a methodical approach to examine the functioning and limits of language through a series of meaningful propositions that culminate in self-proclaimed nonsense. In this paper, the book's paradox is treated by recognizing that its propositions, while ultimately nonsensical at the conclusion of the demonstration, are essential steps in a logical journey to clarify philosophical problems. Once the problem is solved and the world is seen correctly, these propositions lose their bipolar character and are left behind, not as a chaotic heap of nonsense, but as the completed rungs of a ladder that has fulfilled its philosophical purpose.
ESTE SUFICIENTĂ CLARITATEA? CÂTEVA CONSIDERAȚII DESPRE RECEPTAREA PROPOZIȚIEI 4.112 DIN TRACTATUS
In sentence 4.112 of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein defines philosophy as an activity of logical clarification of thoughts. My aim in this study is a limited historical one, namely, to present the most significant reactions of Wittgenstein’s contemporary philosophers to this statement. I believe that the main attitudes were expressed by Russell in his lectures on logical atomism, by Ramsey in his review of the Tractatus, by Schlick in two studies in which he enthusiastically adhered to the conception proposed by Wittgenstein, and by Price at a conference entitled "Clarity is not Enough?"
Russell’s formal logic has been criticized by some formal logicians as not having fully precise syntax (form). However, he is guided by the principle of formal logic, (Form) that proof depends entirely on form, independently of content. This is a profoundly questionable view of proof. It conflicts with recognizing that (i) “The set of dogs is a non-self-member” and (ii) “The set of cats is a non-self-member” are attributing different properties in spite of having the same predicate. The predicate form Rx: “x is a non-self-member” is common to (i) and (ii) but the content of the predicate, the property attributed, is different. This is the key to resolving Russell’s paradox and is unavailable to Russell due to his commitment to (Form). His “Vicious Circle Principle” is not well stated and its concern with content conflicts with (Form). But a proper understanding of the principle does provide an answer to the “Truthteller Paradox”. That allows me to close on a note of agreement with Russell.
WITTGENSTEIN DESPRE SENSUL LUMII ÎN TRACTATUS 6.41 – O ANALIZĂ CRITICĂ
The following text constitutes a critical analysis of 6.41, from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. As I have understood it, the paragraph contains an argument (central to Wittgenstein's book) meant to support the conclusion at 6.421: "It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. (...)". In what follows I aim to do three things. First, I will talk about the context of 6.41. Then I will try to reconstruct the argument of 6.41 such that its logical structure becomes apparent. Finally, I will consider several critical reactions which could target the argument in its reconstructed form and try to claim that a critical evaluation of Wittgenstein's argument is nowhere near an end.
O A DOUA CRITICĂ A RAȚIUNII TEORETICE? CONCEPTUL CUNOAȘTERII ÎN TRACTATUS
Is there a relationship between the goals pursued and presented in the Critique of Pure Reason and in Tractatus logico-philosophicus? This text argues that such a relationship will be ascertained if we will compare Kant’s answer to the question “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” with the Tractarian answer to the question “How are propositions of natural science possible?”. Based on this comparison, the Tractatus may be deemed to be a “new critique of theoretical reason”. As in the case of the critique of theoretical reason undertaken by Kant, the object of Tractarian investigation is constituted by ascertaining internal requirements for possessing knowledge of the world.
cerințe interne versus cerințe externe ale cunoaşterii lumii