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MOMENTS AND THEIR MEN:
METAPHOR AND ANALOGY IN FACEWORK

Abstract. Offences have negative effects on the public image of the offended party and on the expressive order of the verbal exchange in which they occur. Taking the Goffmanian interchange as a model, the article analyses several interactions in which participants process a possible offence with the help of a particular device consisting of source analogues, in order to neutralize these effects. Participants first map the first source (metaphor) to check whether it correctly identifies the pragmatic value of the offence. Then, they map the second source (analogy) to jointly discover the target configuration. The target – the specific conversational situation in which the offence occurred, along with the resulting balance of power between the interlocutors – is treated as unknown or less well-known than the source. The target is protean and mobile, and may draw in or remove past elements of the ongoing conversation. The participants in the verbal interactions analysed have a high degree of reflexive awareness, as evidenced by the fact that they propose and reject ideas, formulate new proposals, develop them, and ultimately agree on the pragmatic value to be attributed to a particular utterance that is perceived as potentially offensive. The type of moment we are concerned with in this study does not have the disadvantages of excuses, which impose a burden on both the person asking and the person receiving. With this device, participants can effectively negotiate the meaning of an utterance. It also has the ability to build and develop social relations between participants. Mapping the correspondences between the source and the target reveals that there are reciprocal relations between the participants – they are together in the analogy scenario and the differences between the offender and the offended disappear.

Keywords: facework, metaphor, analogy, podcasts.

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1. Introduction

The theoretical data used in this study originate from two distinct research areas. Firstly, I draw on the Goffmanian tradition concerning expressive order and facework, and revisit the concept of 'moment'. On the other hand, I make use of the results of research offered by *Structure Mapping Theory*, *Multiconstraint Theory* and *Conceptual Metaphor Theory*, which are concerned with the functioning of analogy and metaphor. I provide a brief overview of these theories below.

1.1. *Expressive order, facework, moments*

In a study involving browsing through the articles published by E. Goffman in the 1950s, F. Bargiela-Chiappini notes that, "Brown and Levinson's cognitive concept of 'face' and the rational actor does not fit into Goffman's study of interaction" (Bargiela-Chiappini 2003: 1460). From the outset, in the introduction to the volume grouping together his first articles, Goffman indicates that, in fact, any researcher interested in verbal interactions should first study the "syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one another", and only then, and only in relation to such, the "general properties they must have if this sort of contribution is to be expected of them. [...] Not, then, men and their moments. Rather moments and their men" (Goffman 1967: 2-3).

In *On Face-work*, Goffman analyses the situation in which the relation between one's face and the events that occur during the verbal interaction that (s)he takes part in, a relation that the author calls expressive order[2], is damaged by the occurrence of a disturbing element, such as an offence. Goffman calls the restoration of the expressive order a corrective process, which is specifically characterised by a ritualistic verbal interchange, consisting of four movements. When he talks about moments[3], he refers

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[2]   Expressive order is "an order that regulates the flow of events, large or small, so that anything that appears to be expressed by them will be consistent with [a person's] face" (Goffman 1967: 9).

[3]   In his study, Goffman analyses the structure of a *type* and the syntactic relations between the movements that make it. In this article, I shall deal with three *tokens* and then I shall try to come to some conclusions about the type they realize.

to this interchange as well. Leaving aside the disturbing element, *i.e.*, the offence, it is comprised of four movements: the challenge, the offering, the acceptance, and the thanks. The first of these is performed by the offended, the second, by the offender, and so on. Each of these movements can take different forms of manifestation, and the explicit expression of some of them, such as acceptance and thanks, is optional. There are also various strategies for the offering, such as recognising the offending nature of the offence and correcting it, or ignoring the offence and denying it, and strategies for diminishing it, such as the redefinition of the offence and/or the offender, and, finally, apologizing and/or offering a compensation or the self-inflicted punishment of the offender (Goffman 1967: 20-22).

From this moment type we can derive the following definition: a moment is a verbal interaction; there are syntactic relations between its movements; and the result of this verbal exchange is the restoration, improvement, or prevention of damage to the face of the speaker (S) and/or the hearer (H).

1.2. Theories on how metaphors and analogies work

For the way in which this mechanism uses metaphor and analogy to process a potential offence, I rely on the studies that describe how analogy works, the same routine being also used for mapping metaphor. Since the beginning of the 1980s, analogy and a theory that could explain how it operates have been the subject of numerous studies. Over time, two theories prevailed: the *Structure Mapping Theory*, developed by Gentner (1983, 1989, 2003); Gentner, Kurtz (2006); Gentner, Maravilla (2018), and the *Multiconstraint Theory*, developed by Gick, Holyoak (1983); Holyoak, Thagard (1995); Spellman, Holyoak (1996); Holyoak (2005). Although, initially, the two types of theories (the *syntactic* one, proposed by D. Gentner, and the *pragmatic* one, by K. Holyoak[4]) offered significantly different views on

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[4]   The labels are from Holyoak (1985). According to the "pragmatic" theory of analogy, "the aspects of the source analogue transferred to the target will be determined by a variety of factors, including [...] the apparent goal in using the analogy (e.g., what aspects of the target need to be explained)" (Holyoak 1985: 76). On the other hand, the "syntactic" theory claims that, in mapping the correspondences between source and target, the relations between objects are more important than those between the objects'

analogy, recent studies tend to merge the data that they provide into a single theory, as can be seen in Gentner (2003) and Gentner, Smith (2012), which admits the relevance of goal (a core element in the theory promoted by K. Holyoak and P. Thagard) among the criteria used for assessing analogy. The two perspectives on analogy remain, however, different, at least in terms of their favoured scopes: while the former studies analogy primarily as a learning method (Gentner, Hoyos 2017; Wormeli 2009), the second is particularly interested in the use of analogy as a problem-solving tool (Holyoak, Thagard 1989; Holyoak, Thagard 1995; Spellman, Holyoak 1996). The studies dedicated to developing a coherent model of analogy operation have also produced a rich specific jargon, as can be seen in Gentner, Smith (2012) or Gentner, Hoyos (2017).

The studies dedicated to analogy highlight its role in decision-making and in the production of knowledge in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, theology, philosophy, physics, biology, and linguistics, as well as in the production of knowledge in everyday life.

Regarding this last field, in Hofstadter, Sander (2013), for example, there is a chapter dedicated to caricatural analogies. We use such analogies to explain different things to others or to explain to ourselves the various situations in which we find ourselves. The analogical targets of these analogies reveal correspondences that others or ourselves have not been aware of. However, the cited authors do not study the analogies in the communicational situations in which they occur, nor the ways in which analogies can determine changes to those communicational situations. Holyoak, Thagard (1995) also emphasize how an analogy can sometimes be the most effective way to communicate information, be a vector for humour, have emotional and cognitive effects, avoid awkward situations, or foster emotions that contribute to maintaining peace and solidarity within the different social groups.

Analogy is a *mental bridge* (Hofstadter, Sander 2013: 434), *i.e.*, the bridge between two analogues and the action that connects them. The specialized literature calls these two analogues *source/base* and *target*, although, in pre-1980s studies, they are labelled respectively as *phoros* and

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attributes, and that the specific relations mapped are determined by systematicity (*i.e.,* the preference for matching systems of deeply connected relations), as shown in Gentner (1983); Falkenhainer, Forbus, Gentner (1989); Gentner (2010).

theme (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971: 373). The analogy arises when a common relational structure aligns the source and the target. Analogy is also a way of "learning something more general using the source and target as examples" (Holyoak, Thagard 1995: 101), which makes it a heuristic method. Source and target situations can be defined as configurations of objects (or parts), their features, and the relations between them. Causal relations arise between the parts of one and the same analogue, while relations of similarity exist between the corresponding parts of different analogues. The connection of all these aspects is called mapping, which can be attributive, relational and systemic – the latter referring to correspondences "based on similar higher-order relations coupled with a high degree of one-to-one mapping and structural consistency" (Holyoak, Thagard 1995: 31). Systemic mapping is specific to analogy to such an extent that we can say that "what distinguishes analogy from other kinds of similarity is that for two situations to be analogical, they must be similar in their relational structure" (Gentner, Smith 2012: 131).

Other important distinctions oppose projection *vs.* alignment, and matching *vs.* carry-over, the elements in both pairs being strongly polarized. Gentner, Hoyos (2017: 674) use two types of metaphorical sources to differentiate between projection and alignment. A conventional metaphorical source, such as *a gold mine*, projects onto the target a standard abstraction ("X is a gold mine" means "X is very valuable"), while a metaphorical source that has not been conventionalised yet, such as *a snowflake*, reveals a common structure between the two analogues only after their alignment ("X is a snowflake" could mean, for example, depending on the target, "X is unique", "X is delicate", "X is ephemeral", etc.). When using analogy as a learning method, Gentner (1989) distinguishes between pure matching and pure carry-over. In the case of a perfect correspondence, the learner has certain information about both analogues, and the analogy highlights the correspondence between them rather than the transmission of new knowledge. At the opposite end, that of acquiring new knowledge, the learner has some information about the source, but knows nothing (or almost nothing) about the target. Following the mapping of the two domains, the subject transfers a known system of predicates from source to target.

While transferring the systems of relations from source to target, candidate inferences also appear. A candidate inference is a fact posited about the target, based on the completion of the common relational structure between source and target; "a frequent outcome of making an analogy is that candidate inferences are generated by completing the missing relational pattern in the target" (Gentner, Smith 2012: 132).

Once the mapping of the two domains is completed, evaluation takes place. Among the factors used for evaluating an analogy and the inferences that it has generated, Gentner, Smith (2012) list factual correctness and adaptability, goal relevance, and the amount of new knowledge that the analogy and its inferences have provided.

As for metaphor, it has long been considered "a condensed analogy, resulting from fusion of an element from the phoros with an element from the theme" (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971: 399), an opinion also promoted in Gentner *et al.* (2001); Gentner, Bowdle (2008); Wolff, Gentner (2011), which also means that metaphor accepts the same mapping procedure as analogy (Gentner *et al.* 2001). In the CMT (*Conceptual Metaphor Theory*), metaphor is mapped in the same way and according to the same principles as analogy (Landau, Robinson, Meier 2014).

1.3. The objective and structure of the article

It is probably obvious that the restoration of expressive order is an objective that can be achieved in several ways, and that the type of verbal interchange analysed by Goffman is just one of them. Bălășoiu (2023), for example, analyses the occurrence of a conversational impasse and, in order to overcome it, the two participants (the host of a podcast and his guest) invent and co-narrate a unique and unrepeatable story. Its narrative substance is inspired by the answer that the guest gives to a question asked by the host, which then produces the offence. Such a story is constructed based on an easy-to-learn pattern, and the objective of its narration has to do not with the host's intention to offer a compensation to his guest, but rather with the exhaustion of all possible narrative threads, the real-time verification of the creative availabilities of the two co-narrators and the exhaustion of the effects produced by the offence through the

narration itself. The case analysed in Bălășoiu (2023) is not unique, it is just a token of a different moment type than the one analysed by Goffman.

I focus here on how metaphor and analogy work in tandem to negotiate the pragmatic value of certain utterances that represent potential offences. After all, the process of establishing the pragmatic value of an utterance is, in itself, a facework, with important consequences on the expressive order of a verbal interaction. My main objective is to analyse the effectiveness of a specific type of moment employed by participants in facework and to emphasise its superiority over the Goffmanian model.

The structure of my study is as follows. In the second part, I provide some methodological commentary. I discuss the criteria used to select the podcast episodes that were used as examples, how the data was transcribed, and how the utterances that make up the moments were processed. In the third part, I analyse four different communicative situations extracted from video podcasts, attempting to identify commonalities. The information obtained in this section is used in a chapter dedicated to general observations, enabling conclusions to be drawn.

2. Methodology

The general framework in which I analyse the verbal interactions in this study is that provided by the co-constituting model of communication, in which the face of the participants in the verbal interaction is a relational and interactional outcome – a way of understanding things that is closer to the Goffmanian perspective on face than that proposed by the theory of politeness in Brown, Levinson (1987). In this model, "a first speaker's utterance affords a certain range of interpretings, but does not determine which one of these interpretings will be operative in the conversation" (Arundale 2006: 196), because "all interpretings are provisional until assessed in view of an interpreting of the adjacent utterance of another" (Arundale 1999: 142).

The type of moment I examine here demonstrates the importance of context when interpreting the meaning of utterances, as well as the fact that interlocutors share a great deal of knowledge and similar ways of interpreting it. This enables them to map the same sources, allowing

them to arrive at new knowledge. The acquisition of additional knowledge is an undeniable sign that the mental bridge of analogy has been realised. Therefore, it was necessary to find communication situations in which the participants were roughly the same age, shared the same knowledge and were encouraged by the framework of the meeting and the topics of conversation to play.

The examples analysed below thus illustrate a type of informal communication (the participants in the conversation are friends or know each other, are actors and/or work in the media or entertainment industry), which is specific to podcast programmes (verbal interactions carried out in a studio, in the presence of a film crew), in which the communication is both personal and public (the host and the guest interact with each other and with the members of the film crew; the host/guest interacts with the followers watching the podcast).

This type of interaction is both playful and serious, in the sense that the relaxed attitude and playful mood of the participants are only the premises for engaging in a serious activity. An important feature of these interactions is the fact that the participants display a high degree of reflexive awareness[5]. This is central to the moment type analysed here, one in which the participants in the verbal interchange negotiate and come to agree on the pragmatic value of an utterance and then of an entire conversational configuration.

The rules provided by *IVLRA* have been used for the transcription of the podcast snippets, with a few minor modifications.

I have labelled the lines relevant to the analysis and, in square brackets, identified the value of the utterances that form part of the two types of moment analysed. For example, in Case 1, I have used the labels [offence], [source], [challenge1], [apology] and [acceptance] to illustrate the type of moment discussed by Goffman. In contrast, I have used [offence], [target], [source] and [challenge2] to label the utterances from the other three cases analysed, which illustrate the type of moment that is the focus of this study. I have also italicised the respective movements within each moment. The labels [challenge1] and [challenge2] indicate different functions, which will be discussed in §3.1.

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[5]   Reflexive awareness is "the ability to not only interpret one's own linguistic behaviour but also the behaviour of others and to judge its appropriateness" (Culpeper, Haugh, Sinkeviciute 2017: 334).

As the article is written in English, I have translated the verbal interactions under examination into English. However, for comparison, their transcription in Romanian is also provided in the *Corpus* section.

3. Case studies

The situations to be discussed have several things in common, one of which is miscommunication. Participants solve these issues either by resorting to the classical Goffmanian ritual (see §3.2.1), or by employing a specific structure, which I shall describe below, and which will be examined in the following three cases (§3.2.2, §3.2.3 and §3.2.4).

3.1. Moments...

The moment type under examination here has the following structure:

> 0. B makes a statement that can be interpreted as an offence (= the target of the metaphor in 1);
> 1. A proposes a source equating statement 0;
> 2. A and B map the metaphor;
> 3. A proposes a new source;
> 4. A and B map the analogy and evaluate the inferences.

This scheme shows that one of the participants in the verbal exchange proposes a metaphor for the verbal act in 0, which can be assimilated to an offence. The problem with this metaphor is that it is the personal choice of speaker A, and it may fail to maintain plausible connections with the target (the utterance in 0) when mapped at point 2, in the sense that B may or may not validate its ability to do so. At this point, speaker A returns with a new source, providing an opportunity for speakers A and B to map the connections between it and the utterance in 0 together. This time, the mapping proves successful.

In the type of moment that is the focus of my study, the metaphor does not function as a *challenge$_1$*, in the sense in which such a movement

appears in the ritual described by Goffman[6]. In such moments, the utterance (or sequence of utterances) referred to in the metaphor (*i.e.*, its target) is not considered a misconduct from the outset. The only challenge that S addresses to H (*challenge₂*) is to find a pragmatic value for the target together (statement 0, *i.e.*, the potential offence).

3.2. ... and their men

What follows is an analysis of four verbal exchanges in which the expressive order appears to be facing threats that could damage it. Case 1 is resolved through the ritual analysed by Goffman, but I am only interested in this case as a point of comparison for the other three.

Following the presentation of each verbal exchange under analysis, I provide a brief description of the relationships between the participants and the discursive context in which the moment occurs (*Context*). This is followed by observations on how the particular moment functions (*Observations*), which will inform both a general discussion of the problem (§4) and the formulation of conclusions.

3.2.1. Case 1: An exclusion

(1)   1.   Andi Moisescu: dude↓ how crazy was that /jingal/[7] I just can't forget↓ because we didn't have a clue about what it meant↓ but it sounded cool to us ((he puts his hand to his left ear))
       2.   Andreea Esca: I don't know which one it was↑
       3.   AM: you don't know↑ it was the one with↓
       4.   AE: no:↓
       5.   Răzvan Exarhu: yes↓ it was somethin' taken from an ad for the Hungarian post service or somethin' of this↓ kind I think↓ apparently↓ and it meant a formidable foursome or something like <ᴘ [that or I don't know>↓

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[6]   *Challenge* is an "[act] by which participants take on the responsibility of calling attention to the misconduct; by implication they suggest that the threatened claims are to stand firm and that the threatening event itself will have to be brought back into line" (Goffman 1967: 20).

[7]   Eng. *jingle.*

6. AM: right↓] I asked someone and they told me "a formidable quartet"
7. RE: or that↓ yes↓
8. AE: ah::↑
9. +AM: I was thinking "dude↓ why a quartet↑" I thought it was something related to /jez/[8]↓
10. AE: /ishtenem↓ ishtenem↓ hesush mário↓/[9]
11. RE: yes it was probably about some services↓ [anyway it was:
12. E: it was definitely about some services] always
13. +RE: sounded very:↓ yes↓ mysterious and pleasant↓ an' melodious↓
14. AM: melodious↓ yes↓ it was /pro efem↓ a sensatzioz niɣesh↓/[10] ((AE laughs))
15. +RE: and after that I became a fan of the band uh: neoton [faMIlia↑
16. AM: neoton familia] man↓ I had I had a double album at home↓ but I don't know↓ it got lost somewhere↓ [9-11-13-14-15-16 – possible RE&AM's offence]
17. AE: *I feel like I'm watching a tennis match here↓* you know↑ ((turns her head from one to the other)) [*bang↓ bang↓* [source; challenge₁]
18. RE: yeah↓
19. AM: forgive us↓ [forgive↓ us↓ [apology]
20. +RE: and: they had a]
21. AE: no↓ no problem↓ [acceptance]
22. +RE: they had a lead vocalist
23. AE: mm:hmm↓
24. +RE: you know how Hungarians have these very deep voices (*Andi Moisescu*, 1:28-2:18)

Context. In the podcast edition from which I extracted the excerpt above, the host of the show, Andi Moisescu, has two guests, Andreea Esca and Răzvan Exarhu, and there is a fairly large sequence in which he talks only with the latter of the two. Andreea Esca thus witnesses a verbal interchange from which she is excluded and she signals this in line 17.

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8 Eng. *jazz.*
9 Hun. *istenem Jézus Mario* (approx. "Oh, Jesus Christ and Mother of God!").
10 Hun. *egy Szenzációs négyes* ("a sensational quartet").

Observations. In the verbal interchange in (1), the metaphor in line 17 operates as a challenge in the sense of the Goffmanian ritual, and AE obtains an apology from AM – most likely because the latter considers that his guest has used the metaphor to request the apologies that she is entitled to request. In other words, the target of the metaphor here is classified *post factum* as an offence. But how does AM go from metaphor to apologies? We could say that, in order to map the metaphor, he performs an alignment between relation maintained by the objects of the source (a spectator ignored by the players on the field), and the relation maintained by the target's objects (AE is ignored by the other two interlocutors), which suggests that AE utters 17 to imply "talk to me too". While uttering 17, AE repeatedly turns her head from AM to RE and vice versa. It is also important that, in line 17, the subject pronoun *I* is expressed, thus underlining an opposition[11]. The verbal act conveyed by AE in 17 meets all the conditions of an implicature, as defined by M. Haugh: "it is not literally said, it is inferred in a particular context, it is defeasible, and it is meant in addition to what is literally said" (Haugh 2002: 127).

However, the metaphor in 17 is not an accurate depiction of the discursive reality in (1). While AE considers herself a mere spectator, nothing in the reality of the metaphorical source leads us to infer that the players on the field are bound in any way by any rule to pay attention to her and, thus, to offer her compensation when, for one reason or another, they ignore her. Also, the metaphor does not convey in any way that AE has been downgraded from the previous status of player to the current status of spectator. And this is because AE is not *a spectator* watching a tennis match, as the metaphor suggests, but *a player* in a match with three players. AM would therefore have been entitled to question the equivalence of sequence 9-16 (the potential offence) with 17, just as the phrase "I feel like I'm watching a tennis match here" could imply "you are throwing your lines/balls at each other at such a speed, that I can barely keep up with you".

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[11]   Romanian is a full pro-drop language; usually, the pronoun *I* is not expressed when it is used as a subject, being inferred from the form of the predicate. The fact that, in this case, it is expressed, functions as a metapragmatic indicator, because it reflects that AE is aware of where she stands in the particular discursive context in (1) and emphasizes her difference in status compared to the other two participants in the verbal interchange.

What would suit the balance of power here (*i.e.*, for the target situation) would be a source such as "we are now playing a tennis match with three players, three courts and three nets". We have every reason to believe that such a source analogue would have stopped the conversation between AM and RE for a while: the effort of processing (mapping the correlations and making the inferences) the analogy would have been greater than that required by the metaphor in 17, which AM processes instantaneously (almost by virtue of a conditioned reflex), and RE simply ignores. However, it is very unlikely that AE proposed here a source, after having formulated the metaphor, because:

a. the metaphor has a target (the verbal interchange consisting of lines 9-11-13-14-15-16 and AE's two utterances, 10 and 12, which receive no response) whose offensive nature is validated by the participants – or at least by AM (who considers that AE requests an apology from him by means of the metaphor) and by AE (who, after receiving the apologies, considers that she had asked for them);

b. the Goffmanian ritual is completed: AM formulates an apology in line 19, and AE explicitly accepts it in 21, which means that the expressive order is successfully restored, and the transaction is considered concluded.

3.2.2. Case 2: A possible innuendo

(2)   1. Caroline Fernolend: my grandfather↓ always used to say↓ that you should eat↓ just how much you need↓ to be able to work↓ so work was more important↓ # while he used to say that Romanians worked so that they could eat↓ so for ((RE laughs)) so [for Romanians- [possible CF's offence; target]

2. Răzvan Exarhu: *this was a sort of foul↓ like this↓* ((uses his hands to mime a strike given from the side)) [source; possible RE's offence; challenge₂]

3. CF: no:: it's not⊥ but I'm glad <ᵣ that we, Saxons, learned a lot of things from the RoMAnians↓> to↓ to eat more↓ ((RE laughs)) [and BEtter↓ ## <@ it was no foul↓>

4. RE: no no no↓ I was kidding↓]
5. CF: yes↓ # but↓ uh: that's why-
6. RE: <ₛₘ *I know what it's like to just put your scythe away somewhere with the blade up↓ to the side like this↓ and knock down a biker or two↓ that's it↓ no:>* ((both laugh)) [source] (*Ac de siguranţă**, #4; 6:20-7:06)

Context. The communication situation in (2) brings Răzvan Exarhu, the producer of the show, face to face with Caroline Fernolend, Executive Director of the Mihai Eminescu Trust Foundation. Caroline Fernolend is known for the fact that she managed to rebuild the community in the Transylvanian village of Viscri and transform it into a UNESCO site. The two talk about how CF achieved these things and about the values of the traditional Saxon village.

One of these values is moderation, and CF quotes her grandfather in this regard, in 1. Thus, line 1 is relevant because it is used to illustrate, in particular, moderation, and, in general, a set of life-guiding principles passed down from generation to generation in the Saxon communities. From this point of view, there is nothing aggressive about reporting the quotation in 1.

However, RE notes that 1 could be read at two distinct levels, which would give it a double function: on the one hand, it would quote a third party and, on the other hand, it would send a personal message to the interlocutor, a sort of foul, as RE metaphorically puts it, committed by CF on RE.

Observations. In order to be able to map the metaphor, the two interlocutors (and anyone else interested in doing so) must bring to the context information that had been left in the background up to that moment, and considered less interesting. The principle of the metaphor requires the receiver *to downsize* the number of important features until they reach the most relevant of them or until they identify their commonality. In order to understand what this "foul kick" means exactly, we need to know that RE is Romanian, tall, well-built, a chef, likes food, has a culinary website (exarhu.ro) and a series of video culinary recipes (*Farfuria lui Exarhu***) sponsored by Auchan Retail

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*   *Safety Pin.*
**   *Exarhu's Plate.*

Romania, and, in the podcast *Ac de siguranță* #4, from which I have taken excerpt (2), he also talks about food, cooks, and enjoys a meal with Caroline Fernolend. The sequence "my grandfather used to say that Romanians worked so that they could eat" would therefore be a foul because CF, apparently quoting a third party, would actually be telling RE "you really like to eat (and not so much to work)".

However, CF disagrees with this equivalence and tries an alternative explanation of 1 through 3, a line that, in the Goffmanian ritual, would work as a compensation for the offence in 1, assuming that 1 is indeed an offence and that RE is really offended. But if line 1 is not a foul, it means that it does not have a subtext – much less one that deviates from the meaning of the quote. But what is this meaning? In 3, CF claims, no more and no less that, in the simile in 1, Romanians do not represent the negative model, but the positive one, and that "we, Saxons, have learned from Romanians to eat more and better", a practice that does not seem at all consistent with the patriarchal precept in 1.

But things are even more complicated, because the metaphor in 2, *i.e.*, of the foul, which, in Goffman's scheme, would function as a challenge, has the disadvantage of being interpretable: it could also be a verbal act potentially threatening for CF's face, because, if we accept that, through 2, RE is accusing CF of untrue statements, this utterance is also a foul, committed this time by RE on CF. In this case, according to the Goffmanian ritual, 4 should be a line by which RE would try to neutralize the threatening nature of 2, that is, a dodge by which the verbal act in 2 is redefined as a joke and nothing more. However, the explicit identification of line 2 as a joke could be just a helping hand extended by RE to CF, who is on the verge of resuming her efforts aimed at claiming, in 5, the implausible interpretation in 3. When we talk about a helping hand, we refer to a case of cooperative divergence, a phenomenon quite common for the type of interaction dealt with here, a term which designates the collaboration between interlocutors placed, theoretically, at opposite ends (e.g., offended and offender). For example, at the time of issuing an offence – or an utterance that can be interpreted as such – at least some of the movements of the participants seem to be decided by the answers that they can give to the following questions:

a. how easy to defend (including by the potential offender) is the offended person's position?, and

b. how easy to defend (including by the potential offended person) is the position of the offender?

RE suggests that the metaphor of the foul should not be taken seriously (or not entirely), and, by labelling it as a joke, he prepares an exit from the mechanism, which he achieves by means of the source in line 6, a scenario in which, in a mountain setting, a mower carelessly abandons his scythe, invisible to a biker whose presence in the clearing with grass to cut is implausible, unforeseen, and surprising.

The principle of analogy requires the receiver *to exhaust all* correspondences between the features of the source and those of the target. A source such as "I know what it's like to just put your scythe away somewhere with the blade up and knock down (with it) a biker or two" is a complex scenario, and mapping the correspondences between this source and the target analogue (*i.e.*, the particular conversational configuration having generated the "offence" and the resulting balance of power between the interlocutors) produces what C. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca call a rich analogy[12]. In this case, for example, there is an alignment of the causal relation between the mower from the source and CF (or RE, because he states that he *knows* how the event in the source unfolds, because he did some mowing back in the day as well, as can be proven, possibly, by line 2), and between the biker in the source and RE (or CF, who is presented as the presumptive, albeit perhaps innocent, author of a foul). This relation mirrors that between the host and the guest, each of the two being able to have, in turn, either one or the other of these roles, because RE (townsman) is invited to CF's home (in a rural area) but, at the same time, CF (the one who put the village of Viscri on the map, as they say) is invited to RE's show (the one who wants to learn how this happened). However, the mapping does not end here, because it is then followed by the projection of a possible candidate inference. The causal relation

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[12]   "When we say that every analogy involves a relation among four terms, we are, of course, giving a schematized picture of things. In fact, each term may correspond to a complex situation, and such a situation is precisely what makes a rich analogy." (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971: 372)

between the mower and the biker entails a series of relations between the features that these two have in the source scenario, the mower being a familiar and predictable element on a mountain pasture, while the biker is an unfamiliar and unpredictable one. Therefore, the candidate inference, projected from the source onto the target, would be the following: just as we can very well imagine the scenario of a biker accidentally lacerated by a scythe, what we have called a (deliberate) foul can ultimately be taken as a simple accident (unintentional, therefore excusable)[13].

As such, the strength of this analogy and its ability to function as an exit from the mechanism are suggested both by the *mutual* relation between the mapped elements – CF and RE can be, in turn, either the mower (the unwitting author of an accident) or the biker (its victim), – and by the fact that they project the inference "we behave similarly, and the offences (even if they exist) are accidental and excusable".

3.2.3. *Case 3: A change of status*

(3) 1. Silviu Petcu: [...] because today we have here with us <A, F, MARK Răzvan Exa:rhu:::>↓
     2. Alex Zob: ya:::y
     3. SP: he's always so calm↓ you'd think that⌐ considering his liveliness during /mornin_glori[14]/ you'd think "OMG↓ he kicks ass↓" but instead he's
     4. AZ: saving his energy↓
     5. SP: I think↓ not↓ he spends the rest of his time doin_nothing↓ he's very composed↓ ve-
     6. Răzvan Exarhu: I have no headset↓ ((SP and AZ laugh))
     7. SP: people always tell you in your ear what to do-
     8. RE: I have a teacher↓ an old retiree lady from Buzău↓ <AL who also wrote my book> and who tells me↓ writes my texts↓ ((SP and AZ laugh))
     [...]

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[13] "To make the novel seem familiar by relating it to prior knowledge, to make the familiar seem strange by viewing it from a new perspective – these are fundamental aspects of human intelligence that depend on the ability to reason by analogy" (Gick, Holyoak 1983: 1-2).

[14] Eng. *Morning Glory* (the title of a morning radio show).

9. RE: eh: that's what it's all about↓ you know↑ the disappearance of the TV guide is something that urges people to watch↓ EVEN more↓ but also in a more chaotic manner↓ and it becomes very complicated

10. SP: yes it's-

11. +RE: to find all these↓ and everything becomes very loud↓ and it SEEMS that you also have to watch a lot↓ and this↓ yes↓ [puts you down↓

12. SP: when I⌐ when we] started doin_this↓ we didn't even think that someone could have the patience and listen to a conversation for ## thirty forty minutes↓ because that's the average time of #

13. RE: yes↓

14. +SP: it takes about twice as much and in about two rounds uh people watch the whole podcast↓ you know↑ more or less↓ an hour and a half↓

15. RE: yes

16. +SP: pretty much the average length of a podcast↓ I said in the beginning "man↓ nobody will last more than five minutes"↑ but it's catchy↓ because uh if you're uh if they like Răzvan or if they like Zob or if they like Petcu↓ people wait to "dude↓ what did they say↑ what are they talking about↑ they're talking about this" and so if you're in the car↓ if you're at home↓ in the evening or I don't know↓ cooking or chopping things↓ you turn it on↓ [12-14-16 – target]

17. RE: *this is a sort of: advertorial now*↓ [source; challenge₂]

18. AZ: <@ ri:ght>

19. SP: I enjoyed saying it too↓ I wrote it the day before yesterday

20. AZ: <@ we're gonna we're gonna use it as a frame>↓

21. SP: but I don't have↓ I don't have that lady from Buzău]

22. RE: *"have a PODcast↓"* ((AZ and SP laugh)) [source]

23. SP: *when you're in the kitchen↓* [source]

24. RE: yes↓ (*Boomerul și Milenialu'**** #33, 0:15–0:46; 21:13-22:30)

*** *The Boomer and the Millennial.*

Context. The podcast entailing the verbal interaction in (3) has two hosts – Silviu Petcu and Alex Zob, actors – and a guest, Răzvan Exarhu, who also appeared in the previously analysed verbal exchange.

In the broader context of his conversation with RE about switching from fixed-time television programmes to online video streaming services and the effects of such a change, SP recalls his own doubts about the reasons for which someone would have listened to or watched a podcast ten years ago. However, RE points out that the sequence of lines 12-14-16 is subject to interpretation: it could be a commercial, featuring SP, for his own show.

Observations. The unexpected and unflagged pop-up of an ad in a conversation is always annoying, because it switches between two types of interactions that are significantly different in nature and purpose: conversation *vs.* advertising. It has the effect of interrupting communication with the interlocutor, whom the columnist/advertiser now assimilates to a target audience. Let us remember, for example, the sequence in the movie *The Truman Show* in which Meryl (Laura Linney) asks her husband, Truman Burbank (Jim Carrey), if he would like her to make him a cup of *Mococoa*. Meryl's offer clashes, by the way it is made, with the rest of their conversation, which takes place in their kitchen, but it makes sense in the simulated reality of the live giga production about the character's own life.

Through the metaphor in 17, RE points to the fact that the sequence 12-14-16 could pass for an advertorial. An advertorial is an advertisement made to resemble an editorial content and by using the means of an editorial content; therefore, by its very nature, it is not what it wants to suggest. Even if it is not an authentic advertorial, the sequence 12-14-16 is most likely to function like one, through its plea in self-defence nature and its length. Unlike Meryl, who, at Truman's challenge ("What the hell are you talking about?"), tries to make him believe that everything was nothing more than "a meaningless event" (Goffman 1967: 20), SP promptly and cheerfully admits that he prepared his advertorial in advance.

Analysed from the perspective of the ritual described by Goffman (1967) or Lakoff (2001), line 19 would be a strategy for redefining the

threatening act in 12-14-16, which, in this case, would not take the form of an apology but of a justification: speaker admits that the action was deliberate and prepared in advance, but "denies that the action was bad, if properly understood" (Lakoff 2001: 205). That strategy would ultimately aim to restore the expressive order and resume the verbal interchange under renewed conditions. However, in (3), as in (2), there can be no restoration, since the expressive order has not been damaged. But what makes SP consider the advertorial metaphor an invitation to negotiation and not a challenge in the Goffmanian sense? Perhaps the fact that, immediately after RE equates the series 12-14-16 (the target) to the metaphor in 17 (the source), SP is in no hurry to apologize. The truth is that, taken out of context, 19 perfectly resembles a dodge, although it cannot be a dodge unless the subsequent lines of the participants in the verbal interchange validate it as such.

The other host, AZ, proposes in line 20 that the target's advertorial function be verified by using it from there on as an introduction phrase for the podcast *Boomerul și Milenialu'*, and SP ends the series of explanations on the nature of the sequence in question with line 21, in which he justifies the appearance of the target by the fact that he has no alternative but to be both a columnist and an advertiser, given that he does not enjoy the same advantage as RE. The latter had claimed, in 8, that he had an old retiree from Buzău, his grey eminence, helping him with everything. But, because line 8 had obviously been a joke, 21 cannot be taken seriously either. Line 21 is a justification intended not to compensate for a prejudice caused to RE, but only to test the *advertorial* value of the series 12-14-16.

RE then proposes the source in 22, "Have a podcast!". Line 22, in direct discourse, suggests the other important elements of the source, namely the transmitter and receiver of the ad slogan. Between these two source objects and the corresponding elements in the target (*i.e.*, SP and RE) there is a one-to-one alignment relation, which is irreducible, as it places the two in seemingly irreconcilable positions. However, line 22, "Have a podcast!", reminds us, by the way it is pronounced, of the billboards on the streets, of the ads broadcast on the radio or on television in Romania during the communist period, such as "No meal without fish!". The candidate's inference would therefore be that SP's "advertorial" has as much power (to advertise and generate offences) as the communist ad slogans, which

recommended fish consumption and could be found everywhere, including in places intended specifically for selling fish but where fish were nowhere to be seen. SP validates this inference by line 23: "(have a podcast) when you're in the kitchen (for lack of anything else)", and RE expresses, in 24, its agreement with this pragmatic value of 12-14-16.

3.2.4. Case 4: A linguistic global (mis)alignment[15]

(4)   1.   Silviu Petcu: you're VEry active↓
      2.   Mimi Brănescu: for someone in his forties↓ to repeat myself↓
      3.   SP: in his thirties↓ forget about forties↓ you're active for a person in his thirties↓
      4.   +MB: if you stop↓ everything stops↓
      5.   +SP: <F, MARK SCREENwriter↓ ACtor↓ uh: you write BOOKS↓> [possible SP's offence; target]
      6.   MB: *you're here to scold me* ((hits someone with an imaginary stick)) <@*you called me here to scold me↓ right↑*> [source, challenge2]
      7.   SP: no↓ but how↑ how did you↑
      8.   +MB: <@ *feels kind of threatening↓*> [source, challenge2]
      9.   SP: no↓ but HOW did you start writing books?
      10. MB: I didn't set out to write a book↓
      11. SP: ah↓
      12. MB: I've written some plays↓ that I↓ I've been re-writing↓ I've↓
      13. SP: ah↓ and you've↓ you've↓ an-
      14. +MB: and at one point↓ to end this process↓ to stop pretending that I was busy working↓ ((SP laughs)) I was like "I'm busy writing those plays"↓ after talking to a friend – I had thought of it before↓ I told him "let's↓ publish them↓ let's give it a try↓" and through a chain of events↓ that I would call extraordinary↓ I reached Florin Lăzărescu↓ who said "I'll make some phone calls↓ and we'll see"↓ 'cause it was just a proposal↓ I was clueless↓ and the gentlemen from Humanitas and the ladies said "yes↓

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[15] "A and B are globally aligned if they have similar patterns of activation of conversationally relevant linguistic representations and are therefore likely to make similar linguistic choices – that is, to produce similar utterances under similar conditions and to interpret such utterances in similar ways." (Pickering, Garrod 2021: 127)

it's a go↓" and so↓ my book got published↓ just some PLAYS gathered together in a book↓ ## I would say↓ THEAtre plays↓ [possible MB's offence; target]

15. SP: <@ yes↓ I got that> *it's like these people in their sixties-plus don't understand these things↓* [source, challenge2]

16. MB: <SM well no↓ you said (to me)↓ it seemed that you spoke a bit louder↓ and I'd add↓ "clearer↓" so to (say)> ((Silviu Petcu and Alex Zob laugh)) to make sure you understood↓

17. SP: *you know when you go to a foreign country↓* [source]

18. MB: *yes↓ <F, IM English is spoken with force>* [source]

19. +SP: *you have to <F, IM VEry loud↓ VEry loud↓ so that the others understand you↓> you know↑* [source]

20. MB: *yes↓ duh ↓ ## I have a friend in Lehliu and he has a nice story about this↓ <AL at one point> some Portuguese fellows came to work there and one of them was invited to dinner and his father thought that in order to speak Portuguese he had↓ <F to speak louder> in Romanian↓ so that the guy could understand him↓ <F, MARK, IM "/DOmne_ţi place VINU? VInu↑ ie BUN?/"16> and that guy ((shows that he doesn't understand)) "he doesn't understand, dad↓ stop talking so loud" he said↓ but he kept on doing that the entire evening↓* [source]

21. Alex Zob: there's: a phrase that means ⊥ that goes ⊥ I remember having heard it at one time↓ and when I went to Portugal#↓ every time I met a local, I said the phrase < IM "cu carne de vacă nu se moare de foame"17> and it's identical↓ well, I mean, not identical↓ it's very close to ⊥ in Portuguese it's /con carne de vaca nu se more de fom/↓18 and it's↓ you know↑

22. MB: which means the same thing?

23. AZ: means the same thing↓ yes↓ means the same thi-

24. MB: <@ you kicked ass↓ I suppose↓ you impressed everyone↓>

25. AZ: I did# [that was my */picap picap lain/*19 you know↑

26. +MB: <@ you went and told them that straight away]> when [I want to say something↓

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16   Eng. *MISTER, how do you like the WINE? Is the WIne GOOD?*

17   Eng. *you can't starve with beef.*

18   Por. *não se pode morrer de fome com carne de vaca.*

19   Eng. *pickup line.*

27. +AZ: every time a Portuguese came to me "I want to tell you something"↓
28. SP: I know something in your language↓ if you want me to give it to you↓
29. MB: something to close the discussion↓ a fine conclusion↓ (*Boomerul și Milenialu'* #125, 1:56-4:29)

Context. The podcast from which I have extracted excerpt (4) has the same hosts as in the case of excerpt (3), and the guest is Mimi Brănescu, screenwriter, playwright and actor. In a manner similar to the situation in (2), MB and SP each play simultaneously the role of possible offender and possible offended. Line 5, uttered by SP, "(you are a) screenwriter, actor, you write books" and lines 12 and 14, belonging to MB, are flagged as possible offences by their recipients. For SP, a strong intonation is a means of emphasizing admiration (and uttering a compliment), while MB associates it with a scolding. MB associates tautology with the need to make more accurate determinations, while SP believes that tautology occurs when a speaker anticipates that her/his interlocutor has difficulties in understanding her/him. Therefore, MB considers line 5 to be a criticism and equates it with the metaphor "you're here/you called me here to scold me", while SP points out (through the source "it's like these people in their sixties-plus don't understand these things") that line 14 can be associated with tautological and useless clarifications, which offend his intelligence (those born in the years 1946-1964 are *boomers*, *i.e.*, SP himself).

Observations. The metaphor "you called me here to scold me" suggests a scenario marked by an open conflict between the objects that populate it. In Romanian, the verb "a certa" does not mean only "to reprimand", but also "to punish" someone. In fact, MB accompanies the metaphorical sequence in question, even as he utters it, with the gesture of repeatedly hitting someone with a stick, therefore a physical punishment, which implies the presence, in the source scenario, of someone entitled to inflict the punishment on someone else, who is the former's subordinate and who endures this punishment.

SP's line 9, "no↓ but HOW did you start writing books?" is an attempt to reinterpret 5 ("I had no intention of scolding you, on the

contrary, I wondered in admiration how you came to write a book" – in other words, "the question was not meant to be a reproach, but a compliment"), and MB's line 16 is a justification of the tautology in line 14 (a justification that could be rephrased as follows: "I only adapted to the intonation you used when uttering 5: you spoke *louder*, so I spoke *more redundantly too*, to make sure you understood me").

Immediately after, MB and SP formulate a source (sequence 17-18-19-20) – a scenario in which the main actor states (and believes) that the utterance of one and the same phrase implies a causal relation between the intensity of the voice and the meaning of that statement. This relation works according to the principle of communicating vases and is valid for any linguistic pair, chosen at random: for example, by speaking louder in Romanian, you make sense in English, Portuguese, etc. The mapping of the correspondences between the source and the target (*i.e.*, actually the entire verbal interchange that precedes the source) engages both the hosts and the guest equally, as can be seen from the ten lines that follow the source's enunciation. This entire activity is a facework, aimed at restoring the coherence of the communication and at strengthening solidarity between the interlocutors. The last line in (4) can function as a closing signal both for the story told by AZ and for the current verbal interaction.

4. General remarks

The mechanism that I have analysed in the moments above includes four movements, just like the Goffmanian interchange. Leaving aside the initial element (the possible offence), it connects a metaphor and its mapping to an analogy and its mapping.

Here, the mapping activity has a broader meaning than in the classical analogy studies mentioned in §1.2. We must consider that mapping takes place in real time and that participants question the suitability of the source for the target, as well as bringing elements that enrich and broaden the target into the discussion.

In the moments discussed here, the target of the metaphor is a rather clearly delineated utterance/series of utterances. But the target of the analogy lacks a clear outline and a fixed number of objects, of their attributes, or of relations established between them; instead, it is developed

and populated with objects as the mapping of the correspondences between the target and the source unfolds. The target is protean and mobile, and can end up attracting or eliminating past elements of the conversation, on which it feeds and which it comments upon.

The last three moments analysed have not only the same structure, but also similar paths and outcomes. In (2), Caroline Fernolend rejects the equivalence of her intervention with the metaphorical source of a foul kick but is delighted by the surprising analogy that Răzvan Exarhu offers her, as an interesting object, which they should examine together. In (3), Silviu Petcu "admits" to the deliberate nature ("I wrote it the day before yesterday") of a spontaneous but broader line, which his guest suspected of being an advertorial – but he is surprised by the new light that the analogy, which takes over and develops the metaphor, throws on the target of the metaphor and brings to the development of the scenario that the analogy proposes. In (4), two potentially aggressive metaphors, without any apparent connection to each other, converge into an analogy that provides an explanation for the linguistic behaviour of the participants – a generous analogy, which everyone discovers and highlights with enthusiasm.

The participants in the verbal interactions from which these moments are selected have a high degree of *reflexive awareness*, manifested through the fact that they propose, reject, formulate a new proposal, develop it and, finally, agree on the pragmatic value to be given to a certain statement or to the entire verbal interchange generated by its emergence in the conversation. The metaphors that initiate the negotiation in the moments discussed here are explicit *metapragmatic* indicators; they point to the fact that a (potential) malicious remark, a covert advertisement, a rebuke inferred from the intonation used, or a tautology are discursive fouls. The analogies that create correspondences between the participants in the target and the characters that populate the scenarios in the sources are also metapragmatic indicators by the very fact that they propose sources, map the systemic relations between sources and targets, and give them pragmatic values ready to be used further[20].

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[20]   These being said, I consider that "the metapragmatic description of a verbal activity carried out elsewhere" (Verschueren 2000: 445) can also be achieved through metaphors and

In the moments discussed here, the metaphors function as *challenge* but not in the sense used in the Goffmanian ritual; they are, in fact, an invitation to find together a pragmatic value for the target of the metaphor and for that of the analogy: "is x a foul kick/a scythe laceration?", "is x an advertorial?", etc. Mapping them leads, eventually, to inferences such as: "x can be a foul kick/an accidental scythe laceration, and even a funny one through its unpredictability", "x can be a funny advertorial (if grafted on a communist ad slogan)", "x/y are cases of miscommunication, like when you speak louder in Romanian with a Portuguese". The value of x is discovered each time through *collaboration*, it is not fixed from the beginning and it is not annulled by a ritual aimed at obtaining a compensation. However, the interactions in examples (2), (3), and (4) are also cases of facework.

This type of moment has several advantages over the Goffmanian ritual:

– it has a playful character, which is sometimes explicitly emphasised by the participants;
– it does not have the disadvantages of excuses, which impose burdens both on the person who asks for them and on the person who receives them;
– by using it, participants can effectively negotiate the meaning of an utterance in a verbal interaction;
– it allows participants to express themselves freely, even within the confines of a firmly structured moment;
– it has the capacity to build and develop social relations between participants.

5. Conclusions

(i) In Goffman's type of moment, the fact that the challenge can take the form of a source is purely coincidental (I deliberately chose Case 1, a verbal exchange involving a metaphor as a *challenge*, as described by Goffman). However, in the type of moment analysed in this study, the

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analogies. The fact that they are used to categorize their targets points to their functioning as metapragmatic indicators.

source is an essential constituent of the mechanism and has multiple functions. It formulates the offence, as in Case 2 (utterance 2: *'This was a sort of foul like this* (+ gesture)'); it launches the invitation to map the metaphor and the invitation to map the analogy, as in Cases 2, 3 and 4; or it forms the steps by which the analogy is mapped, as in Case 4:

17. SP: *you know when you go to a foreign country↓* [source]
18. MB: *yes↓ <F, IM English is spoken with force>* [source]
19. +SP: *you have to <F, IM VEry loud↓ VEry loud↓ so that the others understood you↓> you know↑* [source]
20. MB: *yes↓ duh↓ ## I have a friend in Lehliu and he has a nice story about this↓ < AL at one point> some Portuguese fellows came to work there and one of them was invited to dinner and his father thought that in order to speak Portuguese he had↓ <F to speak louder> in Romanian↓ so that the guy could understand him↓ < F, MARK, IM "/DOmne_ți place VINU? VInu↑ ie BUN?/" > and that guy ((shows that he doesn't understand)) "he doesn't understand, dad↓ stop talking so loud" he said↓ but he kept on doing that the entire evening↓* [source]

Therefore, our moment can be defined as a device comprising an offence and two successive challenges (*i.e.*, metaphor/analogy mapping invitations). All three moves can be realised by a source. The only move that cannot take the form of a source is rejecting the metaphor. However, since this rejection is intended to challenge the metaphor's ability to represent the offence, it itself constitutes a challenge, leading to the final challenge: mapping analogy. After all, *a source is presupposed by all these steps*, either explicitly or implicitly;

(ii) However, the role of metaphor in the analysed moments differs from that of analogy. Metaphor indicates a potential issue and opens up possibilities, whereas analogy elegantly closes the device.

The situation in (1) clearly shows that a metaphor conveying an indirect verbal act highlights an imbalance and indicates the person(s) responsible for it, whom it challenges to admit to a fault and offer compensation to the offended. On the other hand, an analogy does not cause the other to admit to a mistake and does not ask for compensation. It

just proposes a scenario that mirrors an impasse and treats the conversational configuration that gave rise to it as a target. While the metaphor generates discrepancies, the analogy signals that the interlocutors have something in common. The analogy broadens the frame of reference and shifts the focus away from *I* onto *we*. The metaphors "this was a foul", "this is an advertorial" and "you called me here to scold me" or simile "it's like these people in their sixties-plus don't understand these things" establish aggressor-victim type similarity relations between the objects of the metaphors and the corresponding objects in the targets, and impose the logic of being granted compensation. On the other hand, mapping the correspondences between the sources in – "I know what it's like to just put your scythe away somewhere with the blade up and knock down a biker or two", "we have podcasts like we eat food", and "all those who don't know a foreign language speak louder to make themselves understood by a native" – and the corresponding target analogues reveal that there are relations of *reciprocity* between the participants or that they are together in the analogy scenario. The analogies in our moments ultimately convey messages such as "both you and I do things the same way", "we are not different" or "we are in this story together";

(iii) The analogy has a heuristic function. The heuristic feature of the analogy is directly related to the fact that the target (the particular conversational configuration having produced the offence and the balance of power between the interlocutors that emerged from it) is deemed unknown or less known than the source. When a speaker proposes a source, this enables the others to assume that the target includes unknown elements and that, by mapping the concordances between source and target, the participants in the verbal interchange will learn something new and important about the communication situation that they are a part of. The implausible source in (2), for example, has the ability to initiate the mapping of potential correspondences between the source scenario and the target one, because it implicitly conveys, through its very wording, the fact that the target implies certain aspects of which the interlocutors are not fully aware. We could therefore say that the main function of the moment type I have analysed here is *heuristic,* just as the function of the moment type analysed by Goffman is corrective;

(iv) The utterance that is the potential offence acquires the pragmatic value that the interlocutors jointly grant it, and the moment ends with the analogy that they map together. Analogy in this moment type and its mapping by all participants in the conversation provides greater satisfaction than that obtained after receiving an apology. The expressive order is enriched, and what is gained is a new and deeper perspective on the conversational configuration that both metaphor and analogy cut out from the verbal interchange, and which forms the target to which they relate. The sequence of sources in Case 4 (quoted above under (i)) clearly shows that the analogy mapping (*i.e.*, facework activity) and its outcome (*i.e.* recovery of the expressive order) are the result of *collaboration* between participants in a verbal exchange. Ultimately, the advantage of the analysed device over the Goffmanian one lies in its ability to encourage collaboration and blur the differences between offender and offended party.

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All links were verified by the editors and found to be functioning before the publication of this text in 2025.

RULES FOR TEXT TRANSCRIPTION

Accent	á	is noted only when it differs from the usual one
	TEXT	emphatic stress (of a word or a syllable)
Intonation	.	falling terminal contour
	↓	falling non-terminal contour
	?	rising terminal contour
	↑	rising non-terminal contour
	!	rejective intonation (slightly falling contour associated with low voice pitch; signals reconsideration by the issuer of her/his previous statement)
Pitch	<A >	high voice pitch (*Alto*)
	<B >	low voice pitch (*Basso*)
Tempo	<AN >	slow speech pace (*Andante*)
	<AL >	fast speech pace (*Allegro*)
Intensity	<F >	loud voice (*Forte*)
	<P >	weak voice intensity (*Piano*)
_		(em dash, between words) legato utterance
-		(en dash) unfinished word
u: / m:		prolongation of a sound; the number of (:) signs indicates, approximately, the duration thereof
'		sound apocope
#		pause; the number of signs indicates, approximately, the duration of the pause
text =		
= text		*latching* (intervention started by a speaker and continued, without a pause, by a different one)
[text		beginning of the overlapping of consecutive interventions
text]		end of the overlapping of consecutive interventions
+A:		continuation of the first intervention while ignoring the overlapping intervention
text ⊥		*false start* (construction abandoned)
" "		sequence placed by the speaker in direct discourse
<@ >		laughter accompanying an utterance
<SM >		smile accompanying an utterance
<MARK >		sequence highlighted through slow (sometimes even syllabified) and accentuated uttering

<IM>	imitation of a person's way of speaking
<READ>	the speaker reads out a text
(( ))	"stage" indications (e.g., coughs, clears his throat, etc.)
( )	probable transcription
/text/	words in foreign languages noted according to audition
xx	unclear text; the number of (x) signs indicates the length of the fuzzy sequence
[…]	sequence not transcribed

CORPUS

(1)
1 Andi Moisescu: băi da' ce dement era /gingălu/ ăla nu po_să uit↓ pentru că noi nici nu știam ce-nseamnă↓ da' nouă ne suna mișto la ((își duce mâna la urechea stângă))
2 Andreea Esca: da' io nu știu ăsta care iera↑
3 AM: nu știi↑ iera unu cu↓
4 AE: nu:↓
5 Răzvan Exarhu: da↓ iera unu luat dintr-o reclamă la poșta maghiară sau ceva de genu↓ ăsta cre-↓ se pare↓ și-nsemna un patru formidabil sau ceva de <ₚ [genu ăsta sau nu știu>↓
6 AM: egzact↓]] ieu am întrebat pe cineva și mi-a zis „un cvartet formidabil"
7 RE: sau așa↓ da↓
8 AE: a::↑
9 +AM: mă gîndeam „bă de ce cvartet↑" mă gîndeam că e ceva legat de /gez/↓
10 AE: /iștenem↓ iștenem↓ hesuș mário↓/
11 RE: da probabil că erau niște servicii↓ [oricum iera:
12 AE: niște servicii ierau oricum] tot timpu
13 +RE: suna foarte:↓ da↓ misterios așa și plăcut↓ da' muzical↓
14 AM: muzical↓ da↓ iiera /pro efem↓ o senzatzioz niɣesh↓/ ((AE râde))
15 +RE: și dup_aia am devenit fan al formației ă: neoton [faMIlia↑
16 AM: neoton familia] tată↓ am avut am avut acasă dublu album↓ da' nu știu↓ l-am rătăcit pe undeva↓
17 AE: ieu zici că sunt la tenis aici↓ știi↑ ((întoarce capul de la unul la celălalt)) [pac↓ pac↓
18 RE: da↓
19 AM: iartă-ne↓ [iartă-ne↓ pe noi↓
20 +RE: și: iei aveau un]
21 AE: nu↓ nu-i problemă↓
22 +RE: aveau un vocalist
23 AE: îm:h↓
24 +RE: știi că ungurii mai au vocile astea foarte profunde (*Andi Moisescu*, 1:28–2:18)

(2)
1 Caroline Fernolend: bunicul meu↓ spunea mereu↓ că trebuie să mănînci↓ doar atît↓ ca să poți să lucrezi↓ deci munca iera mai importantă↓ # pe cînd zicea că romînii lucrează ca să poată să mănînce↓ deci pentru ((RE râde)) deci [pentru romîni-
2 Răzvan Exarhu: ăsta a fost șut] lateral↓ așa↓ ((arată cu mâinile o lovitură dată dintr-o parte))
3 CF: nu:: nu-i⊥ da ieu mă bucur <ᴿ c-am învățat noi sașii multe de la roMÎni↓> ca să↓ ca să mîncăm mai mult↓ ((RE râde)) [și mai BIne↓ ## <₪ nu a fost niciun șut↓>
4 RE: nu nu nu↓ am glumit↓]

5 CF: da↓ # dar↓ ă: de-asta-

6 RE: <ₛₘ știu ce-nseamnă să-ți lași coasa rezemată aiurea↓ într-o parte așa↓ și mai prinzi un biciclist↓ asta ie↓ nu:> ((amândoi râd)) (*Ac de siguranță*, #4; 6:20–7:06)

(3)

1 Silviu Petcu: [...] pentru că astăzi îl avem alături de noi pe <ₐ, ꜰ, ₘₐᵣₖ Răzvan Exa:rhu:::>↓

2 Alex Zob: ie:::

3 SP: iel ieste tot timpu așa foarte cuminte↓ zici că⊥ la verva pe care o are la /mornin_glori/ zici că „mamă↓ sparge↓" da' iel

4 AZ: își păstrează energia↓

5 SP: cred că↓ nu↓ în restu timpului nu face nimic↓ ie foarte cuminte↓ foa-

6 Răzvan Exarhu: n-am cască↓ ((SP și AZ râd))

7 SP: ți se spune totdeauna-n cască ce trebuie să fa-

8 RE: am o profesoară↓ o bătrînă pensionară din buzău↓ <ₐₗ care mi-a scris și cartea> și care-mi spune↓ îmi scrie textele↓ ((SP și AZ râd))

[...]

9 RE: e: despre asta ar fi vorba↓ știi↑ dispariția programului ieste un lucru care-i îndeamnă pe oameni să consume↓ ȘI mai mult↓ dar și mai haotic↓ și-atuncea e foarte complicat

10 SP: da ie-

11 +RE: să le găsești pe toate astea↓ și totu devine foarte zgomotos↓ și PARE că și trebuie să consumi foarte mult↓ și asta↓ da↓ [te pune jos↓

12 SP: io cînd⊥ noi] cîn_ne-am apucat de făcut chesti_asta↓ nici nu credeam că poate cineva să stea ## treizeci patruzeci de minute s-asculte o conversație↓ pentru că asta ieste timpu mediu de #

13 RE: da↓

14 +SP: intră cam de două ori și cam două acoperiri ă vede tot podcastu↓ știi↑ cam așa↓ o oră jumate↓

15 RE: da

16 +SP: cam cît ar dura în medie un podcast↓ io la_nceput am zis „mă↓ mai mult de cinci minute cum să stea cineva"↑ dar te prinde↓ pentru că ă dacă iești ă îi place de răzvan sau îi place de zob sau îi place de petcu↓ stă să „bă da' ce-au zis ăștia↑ despre ce vorbesc↑ despre chestia as-" și_atunci dacă iești în mașină↓ dacă iești acasă↓ seara sau nu știu↓ faci mîncare sau tai acolo↓ dai drumu↓

17 RE: ăsta ie un: advertorial acuma↓

18 AZ: <₍ₐₜ₎ egzact>

19 SP: mi-a plăcut și mie să-l zic↓ l-am [scris alaltăieri

20 AZ: <₍ₐₜ₎ o să-l punem o să-l punem cadru>↓

21 SP: da' ieu n-am↓ ieu n-am doamna aia din buzău]

22 RE: „consumați PODcast↓" ((AZ și SP râd))

23 SP: la bucătărie↓

24 RE: da↓ (*Boomerul și Milenialu'* #33, 0:15–0:46; 21:13–22:30)

(4)

1 Silviu Petcu: iești FOArte activ↓

2 Mimi Brănescu: pentru patruzeci de ani reiau↓

3 SP: pentru treizeci de ani↓ lasă patruzeci↓ pentru treizeci iești activ↓

4 +MB: dacă te oprești se opresc toate↓

5 +SP: <F, MARK SCENArist↓ ACtor↓ ă: SCRII cărți↓>

6 MB: ați venit să mă certați ((bate pe cineva cu un băț imaginar)) <@m-ați chemat ca să mă certați↓ nu↑>

7 SP: nu↓ da' cum↑ cum a venit↑

8 +MB: <@ ie cam cam amenințător așa↓>

9 SP: nu↓ da' CUM a venit asta cu scrisul cărții?

10 MB: ieu nu mi-am propus să scriu o carte↓

11 SP: a↓

12 MB: ieu am scris niște piese↓ pe care le↓ le-am tot scris↓ le-am mai↓

13 SP: a↓ și le-ai↓ le-ai↓ an-

14 +MB: și la u_momen_dat↓ ca să se-nchidă procesu ăsta↓ să nu mă mai prefac c-am treabă↓ ((SP râde)) vezi doamne ieu stau și scriu piesele_alea de teatru↓ după ce-am discutat c_um_priet- iera un gînd mai vechi↓ i-am zis „hai mă↓ totuși să le publici↓ hai să-ncercăm↓" și printr-o conjunctură↓ aș zice extraordinară↓ am ajuns la florin lăzărescu↓ care-a zis „dau ieu niște telefoane↓ să vedem"↓ că iera o propunere↓ nu n-am știut↓ și domnii de la humanitas și doamnele au zis „da↓ facem↓" și așa↓ am o carte publicată↓ sînt niște PIEse adunate într-o carte↓ ## aș zice ieu de TEAtru↓

15 SP: <@ da↓ ast_am înțeles> asta-i ca și cum ăștia din șaizeci plus n-ar înțelege chestiile_astea↓

16 MB: <SM păi nu↓ ai zis (mi-ai)↓ parc-ai vorbit mai tare↓ um_pic și zic↓ „mai clar↓" ca să (zic)> ((SP și AZ râd)) ca să fiu sigur c-ai înțeles↓

17 SP: știi cînd mergi într-o țară străină↓

18 MB: da↓ <F, IM engleza se vorbește mai aplicat>

19 +SP: tre- să <F, IM FOArte tare↓ FOArte tare↓ ca ăla să te-nțeleagă↓> știi↑

20 MB: da↓ păi na↓ ## am un prieten la lehliu și are o poveste frumoasă vizavi de asta↓ <AL la u_moment dat> au venit niște portughezi să lucreze acolo și unu dintre iei a fost invitat la masă și taică-su a-nțeles că limba portugheză se vorbește cam așa↓ <F vorbea mai TAre> în romînă↓ ca să-nțeleagă ăla↓ <F, MARK, IM „DOmne_ți place VINU? VInu↑ ie BUN?"> și-ăla ((mimează neînțelegerea)) „nu-nțelege tată↓ nu mai vorbi tare"↓ zicea ăsta↓ și l-a ținut o seară așa↓

21 Alex Zob: ie: propoziția aia care ie⊥ cu asta⊥ știu c-am aflat-o ieu la un momen_dat↓ și când am fost în portugalia#↓ fiecare localnic pe care-l întâlneam îi ziceam propoziția aia <IM „cu carne de vacă nu se moare de foame"> și-i identică↓ mă rog identică! ie foarte apropiată de⊥ în portugheză ie /con carne de vaca nu se more de fom/↓ și ieste↓ știi↑

22 MB: care-nseamnă același lucru?

23 AZ: înseamnă același lucru↓ da↓ înseamnă același lu-

24 MB: <@ ai fost la-nălțime↓ bănuiesc↓ i-ai impresionat pe toți↓>

25 AZ: i-am impresionat# [ăla iera /picap picap lain/ul meu știi↑

26 +MB: <@ le-ai zis-o p-asta direct]> când [vreau să zic ceva↓

27 +AZ: când venea un portughez „vreau să-ți spun ceva"↓

28 SP: știu eu ceva în limba voastră↓ dacă vreți să v-o dau p-asta↓

29 MB: ceva ca să-nchidem discuția↓ o concluzie fină↓ (*Boomerul și Milenialu'* #125, 1:56-4:29)