Euro-Atlantic Studies New Series

Abstract

Since it gained its independence in 1991, Ukraine received great a ention from the United States. With its strategic position, between East and West, Ukraine and its democratic development after the dissolution of the Soviet Union became a key interest in Western politics. Thus, for almost two decades, U.S. policy towards Ukraine has been centered on achieving and consolidating a democratic, prosperous, and secure country, more closely integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures. But the large size of Ukraine and its ethnic diversity have made it difficult to consolidate its identity as part of the European models. Besides that, Ukraine’s political scene was dominated by oligarchic „clans” that led the state toward corruption, personal conflicts, and a perilous balancing act in foreign policy. For President Barack Obama, the U.S. – Ukraine relations were not a priority in the first years of his administration, but as much as Kyiv entered into a political crisis at the end of 2013 and Russia started its incursion in Ukrainian territory, the Obama administration began to give Ukraine much more importance on its foreign policy agenda. The annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the Russian backing of separatists from eastern Ukraine created an international crisis that tested American leadership and the future of U.S.-Russia relations. This article aims to offer an analysis of the U.S. – Ukraine relations during the Obama presidency, with a primary focus on the measures that the U.S. took after the anti-government protests erupted on the streets of Kyiv in November 2013. The article addresses the problem of NATO enlargement to include Ukraine, why American relations with Kyiv were also viewed as part of U.S. relations with Russia, and why Moscow perceived the U.S. activities in Kyiv as a way to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Abstract

Prior to the 2022 “special military operation” (according to Putin’s view) carried out  by the Russian military in Ukraine, in 2008 Russia had another target in sight along its borders, residing in the infamously unstable region of Transcaucasia, Georgia. In an eerily similar fashion to what the current conflict unfolds in terms of Russian military prowess and display of warfare, in August 2008 the Russo – Georgian War marked the beginning of Russia’s reemergence as a military power for both the West as well as its former Soviet constituent states and further deepened the conflict between the NATO block and Russia. The latter plunged into initiating a long streak of instabilities inside the former Soviet states that broke away from the USSR.  
Many see the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War as manifestations of a renewed geopolitical rivalry between major world powers. Both wars have been driven by a desire to assert Russian dominance and control over the regions in question and have led to various consequences that have had profound implications for the nations involved. In the case of Russia, the invasion of Ukraine has been seen as the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of The Cold War. 
However, for the first part, the Russo-Georgian war solely lasted for 5 days, (stretching from the 8th to the 12th of August), albeit tensions were carried out from earlier that year and turmoil was about to spread at any moment. The primary purpose of sending Russian troops to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was to support these pro-Russian regions’ armies against the Georgian military hidden under different pretexts (i.e., “humanitarian aid” sent to repair a railway in the region of Abkhazia). For the second case, this perspective cannot be applied in the current Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite sporting a similar battle tactic in achieving its goal (keeping in mind that the conflict debuted as early as 2014 with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, as well as the Donbas region by sending Russian troops under the pretext of defending the local “repressed” minority from the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, see Fig.No.1), the Russian military has marked only temporary victories at the cost of a staggering number of casualties. This comes to show that Moscow’s war plan carried out in Ukraine might become a lesson for future aggressors in regard to undermining opponents and show how miscalculations can overturn primary predictions, despite the fact that it is a major power with a bristling arsenal. 

Looking back at the Russo-Georgian War case, the Russians' success had permanently dented Georgia’s image in the long term. It halted the country’s progress of aligning itself with the West by adopting for the first time in 2004 under Mikhail Saakashvili’s presidency a pro-European stance, as well as deterred it from aspiring to join the EU and NATO, by solely remaining a PFP member since 1994. In the case of Ukraine, also a PFP member, but from 1995, their military has undergone training in this NATO partnership and collaboration from that period up to nowadays. Moreover, its geopolitical location, size, and implicated political and economic agents active on its territory also make it a much more valuable pawn on this imaginary chessboard between Russia and the West. NATO and the EU continue their support of Ukraine through the means of its member states that send weapons, ammunition, and many types of light and heavy military equipment, including anti-tank and air defense systems, howitzers, and drones. The Georgian example comes to show that the Russian rhetoric cannot be trusted and that it further continues to spread disinformation, this time around, by accusing Ukraine of staging military provocations in the Eastern Donbas region. Ironically, the Ukrainian government hasn’t had intentions of changing the status quo throughout its eight years of the ongoing war in Donbas by intervening in the occupied Lugansk and Donetsk regions, thus making it even less plausible that Kyiv would have taken such a risk amidst Russia’s largest military mobilization in decades. Putin has gone further, issuing “genocide” claims regarding killings allegedly taking place in the said region. In 2014, the Kremlin justified its military offensive by claiming ethnic Russians were being threatened in eastern Ukraine. Similar accusations were also at the forefront of Russian information warfare in 2008, when the Kremlin blamed Tbilisi for committing ethnic cleansing—a charge later dismissed by a ruling of the European Court of International Rights.  
This paper aims to draw a comparison between the similarities of the Russian forces’ applied strategies during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, and the 2014 Annexation of Crimea and Donbas region with aftermaths in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war respectively, as well as question what were the factors that determined the major differences in the way these two states were perceived by the West, eventually leading to such a different timeline. Furthermore, I will attempt to analyze if one country had more probability to appease to Western political and economic interests, as well as if the geopolitical location and size of Ukraine were of more importance than Georgia’s. I will attempt to justify if Georgia was perceived as a scapegoat that prepared Ukrainian troops for similar future conflict escalations on behalf of Russia, and finally if Russia’s victory in Ukraine is even possible and what the aftermath of that action would be.

Abstract

As development of information and communications technologies rapidly advances within nations, it is the responsibility of society’s key stakeholders – business specialists, non-governmental organizations, researchers, academics and
policymakers, to provide specialized in-depth awareness in regards to security related issues. In order to achieve knowledge on technological challenges and build tailor-made public policies, society’s key stakeholders ought to tackle the impact of digitalization. Nations need to become aware that the process entails the whole of society. As the digital
evolution and revolution emerge and expand become synonymous not only to economic proficiency but to digital disruption as well. We can agree that the evolution of Artificial Intelligence, (Social) Internet of Things, Metaverse, Digital Twins, Human Robots, Virtual Influencers, etc. provides opportunities and challenges to societies that we have never faced before in human history. Given these circumstances, does cybersecurity fully encompass the digital changes and disruption or do we need to further expand our research on digital security?

Abstract

I would like to recall one of the views of the American scholar Robert Kogan, a non-conservative and critic of US foreign policy and a leading proponent of liberal interventionism, who said: "... we are in a moment of the end of dreams and the return to history". Unfortunately, the return to history has a rather or perhaps even too optimistic note if we refer to the years that have passed since the end of the Cold War period, marked among other things by the reduction of some ideological or some military conflicts. Current conditions confirm to us, that what were called "hopes" of the world they did not become realities, and the competition between the great powers was not abandoned, but resumed, and reached a degree and proportions far greater, and with effects far more accentuated and serious, than those we thought of. I am referring in particular to the reality by which the competition that manifests itself, especially in the last few decades, has brought on the stage new actors who impose their presence with a special predisposition from the West to the East and vice versa, with direct reference to the present moment – to China, Japan, North Korea, and Russia and with a relatively short time perspective, India. I am not specifically referring to the large number of the population of China, or India, (which is showing an even greater increase than China's), but to the degree of development and the trend of their evolution in the future. 

Abstract

Russia became a great power fighting for supremacy in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea; the USSR met its objectives at the end of WW2; post-Cold War Russia looked initially as a normal state, but started to act aggressively after 2000; Russia did so neglecting its obligations in accordance with the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act; Moscow’s 2022 aggression on Ukraine calls into question even Russia’s great power status.

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the differences between the previous NATO enlargement rounds that took place between 1999-2020 and the current process involving Finland and Sweden in several key aspects. Firstly, the candidate countries' status differs significantly. Unlike many of the countries that joined NATO in the past 25 years, Finland and Sweden are distinguished by their high level of security and a very efficient, well-organized, and technologically advanced armed forces sector. This suggests that their accession process may proceed more smoothly, given their already robust military
capabilities and stability. Another important difference lies in the historical context surrounding this enlargement. While previous rounds of Eastern Europe NATO’s enlargement occurred in the aftermath of geopolitical shifts such as the end of the Cold War, Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO is a response to the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. For Finland and Sweden, both non-aligned countries with long borders with Russia, the conflict in Ukraine has served as a stark reminder of their vulnerability to external aggression and the need for robust defense capabilities. The war in Ukraine led Sweden and Finland to seek membership within NATO, a membership accession process that, given the severe geopolitical and military crisis, will swiftly end. 

Abstract

In March 2014, the international community faced one of the most serious crises since the end of the Cold War. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Crimea, which had been part of Ukraine, was now part of the Russian Federation territory. Shortly after, Russia’s unexpected invasion of the Crimean Peninsula was followed by an armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine between pro-Russia separatist rebels and the Ukrainian forces. The actions were condemned by the Western states, Russia being sanctioned for breaching international law. The conflict that emerged seemed to be a turning point for Russia’s relations with the West and a reminder of how fragile the peace could be. The crisis not only isolated Russia on the international scene but also raised the political temperature across Europe, causing NATO to look to its own preparedness for war and the need to shore up deterrence. 

Abstract

Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War by Richard Ned Lebow was published for the first time in 2010 at Cambridge University Press, and it is a scholarly work made up of 295 pages on the subject of international relations. It
deals with the frequency and characteristics of the wars that occurred in the last four centuries and analyses the reasons and risks taken by the combative parts, in relation to the realist theory of war, the rationalist theory, and the theory of the
transition of power, using as arguments multiple historical examples. The book is divided into three parts: the previous literature’s analysis and critical remarks referring to war and its causes; a short review of the author’s international
relations theory and six claims about the type of states that are more likely to start a war, using as an example an analytic table of the causes, participants and outcome of the wars that occurred since the seventeenth century up to that date; and the probability of war in the future, taking into account fundamental underlying motives like fear, interest, honor or standing. In the end, an Appendix states the original data used in the book, and there is also a bibliographical list and an Index of names and keywords. 

Abstract

Daniel Tudor is a writer, entrepreneur, and former journalist from Manchester, U.K. He worked for The Economist from 2010 to 2013 as Korea Correspondent, writing about North and South Korea. Tudor graduated with a BA in philosophy, politics, and economics from Oxford University and acquired an MBA from the University of Manchester`s Business School. Among his writings, the most controversial book is North Korea Confidential published in 2015 and translated into Romanian in 2020, a book which ultimately brought him threats from North Korea`s regime. Among other papers, he wrote Korea: The Impossible Country (2012), A Geek in Korea (2014) and Ask a North Korean (2018). He worked as an advisor to the international press to the Moon Jae-In administration between 2017-2018. 

Abstract

Written in 2014, released at the publishing house from Paris, La Découverte, the book Le piège Daech. L’État islamique ou le retour de l’Histoire stands as an elucidatory reading not only on the terrorism and Islamic State issues but also on the contemporary history of the Arab states. The author of this book is Pierre-Jean Luizard, a French historian and researcher specialized in the religious and political problems in the Middle East. Currently, he holds the position of research director at Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris. Aside from Le piège Daech, Luizard published works like La Question irakienne (2002) and Laïcités autoritaires en terres d’islam (2008), as well as articles for the French press.

Abstract

Since its creation in 1949, the Council of Europe has promoted human rights and freedoms, the consolidation of democracy, political dialogue, and cooperation between states in the social, economic, and cultural sectors. Intending to have a united Europe, in which the inclusion and acceptance of diversity are some of the key elements in the growth of the individual, the Council of Europe has been involved throughout the second half of the 20th century, continuing until now, in the development of different levels of education in Europe, especially in teaching history. 

Abstract

To comprehend the brutal war initiated by Russia against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Mark Galeotti published, shortly after the outbreak of the conflict, a comprehensive and insightful analysis of Vladimir Putin's military campaigns. The author is a British scholar and expert in Russian and European security affairs. He has written extensively on topics related to Russian politics, organized crime, intelligence, and military affairs. Mark Galeotti is known for his insightful analyses and commentary on Putin’s regime, and he has authored numerous books and articles on the subject.